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Abstract
The paper introduces a class of zero-sum games between the adversary and controller as a scenario for a ‘denial of service’ in a
networked control system. The communication link is modeled as a set of transmission regimes controlled by a strategic jammer
whose intention is to wage an attack on the plant by choosing a most damaging regime-switching strategy. We demonstrate
that even in the one-step case, the introduced games admit a saddle-point equilibrium, at which the jammer’s optimal policy
is to randomize in a region of the plant’s state space, thus requiring the controller to undertake a nontrivial response which is
different from what one would expect in a standard stochastic control problem over a packet dropping link. The paper derives
conditions for the introduced games to have such a saddle-point equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that in more general
multi-stage games, these conditions provide ‘greedy’ jamming strategies for the adversary.
Key words: Adversarial zero-sum games, control over adversarial channels, security of control systems, control over
packet-dropping links.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The topic of control over a communication link has been
extensively studied in the past decade, with issues such
as the minimum data rate for stabilization [1,2] and op-
timal quadratic closed-loop performance [3,4] being the
main focus. Other issues of interest concern effects of
channel-induced packet loss and/or time-varying delays
on closed-loop performance.
The majority of papers concerned with control over net-
works regards the mechanism of information loss in the
network as probabilistic but not strategic. In contrast,
in the adversarial networked control problem, the com-
munication link is controlled by a strategic jammer who
actively modifies the link to disrupt the control goal. We
broadly refer to such modifications/disruptions as De-
nial of Service attacks; cf. [14].
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Anatural way to describe the adversarial networked con-
trol problem is to employ a game-theoretic formulation.
While the most immediate purpose of the game-theoretic
analysis may be to devise the best defence against strate-
gic attacks, it can also be used to predict possible at-
tack strategies. Originally proposed in [5], the game-
theoretic formulation of adversarial networked control
has been followed upon in a number of recent papers in-
cluding [6,10]. A zero-sum dynamic game between a con-
troller performing a finite horizon linear-quadratic con-
trol task and a jammer, proposed in [6], specifically ac-
counted for the jammer’s strategic intentions and limited
actuation capabilities. A startling conclusion of [6] was
that in order to maximally disrupt the control task, the
jammer had to act in a markedly different way than a le-
gitimate, non-malicious, packet-dropping channel. More
precisely, the jammer’s saddle-point strategy was to de-
terministically drop packets whenever the plant state
was crossing certain thresholds. Once this deterministic
behavior is observed by the controller, it can establish
with certainty that an attack has taken place.
The chief motivation behind the present work is to in-
vestigate whether it is possible in principle for the at-
tacker to be able to conceal its actions by disguising as
a packet dropping link. Naturally, this implies that the
controller has no prior information of the attack taking
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place. In [10], to demonstrate such a possibility, we intro-
duced a model of adversarial networked control (ANC),
which, while capturing the same fundamental aspects of
the problem as in [6], modified the jammer’s action space
so that each jammer’s decision corresponded to a choice
of a binary automaton governing the transmission rather
than to passing/blocking transmission directly. The cor-
responding one-step zero-sum game was shown to have
a unique saddle point in the space of mixed jammer’s
strategies. The optimal jammer’s strategy was shown to
randomly choose between two automata, each having
a nonzero probability to be selected. In turn, the con-
troller’s best response to the jammer’s optimal strategy
was to act as if it was operating over a packet-dropping
channel whose statistical characteristics were controlled
by the jammer. Since under normal circumstances the
controller cannot be aware of these characteristics, and
cannot implement such a best response strategy, the sys-
tem performance is likely to be adversely affected when
the jammer follows its optimal strategy; see Section 4.1.
In this paper, we show that such a situation is not specific
to the ANC problem considered in [10], and it arises in
a much more general zero-sum stochastic game setting.
The only common feature between our problem formula-
tion and that in [10] is the general mechanism of decision
making adopted by the jammer. All other attributes of
the problem (the plant model, the assumptions on the
stage cost, etc.) are substantially more general, to the
extent that unlike [10], the saddle point cannot be com-
puted directly. Instead, for the one-step game, we ob-
tain sufficient conditions under which optimal jammer’s
strategies in the class of mixed strategies are to ran-
domly choose between two actions. That is, to make a
maximum impact on the control performance, the jam-
mer must act randomly, in contrast to [6].
Our conditions for the one-step game are quite general,
they apply to nonlinear systems and draw on standard
convexity/coercivity properties of payoff functions. Un-
der additional smoothness conditions, these conditions
are also necessary and sufficient. Also, we specialize these
conditions to three linear-quadratic control problems
over a packet-dropping link. In two of these problems,
our conditions allow for a direct characterization of a set
of plant’s initial states for which optimal jammer’s ran-
domized strategies exist. We also compute controller’s
optimal responses to those strategies, which turn out to
be nonlinear. The third example revisits the problem
setting in [6], showing that our conditions naturally rule
out randomized jammer’s behaviour in that problem.
Our analysis of the one-step game can be thought of as
reflecting a more general situation where one is dealing
with a one-stepHamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI)
min-max problem associated with a multi-step ANC
problem. Also, even the one-step formulation provides
a rich insight into a possible scenario of attacks on con-
troller networks. For instance, dynamic multistep jam-
ming attacks can be planned so that at each step the
jammer chooses its actions based on the proposed for-
mulation. Greedy jamming strategies where at each time
step the jammer pursues a strategy which is optimal only
at this particular time are discussed in Section 5.
Compared with the conference version [11], here we have
obtained a new sufficient condition for the one-step ANC
game to have a nontrivial equilibrium. This condition
does not require the stage cost to be a smooth func-
tion, which potentially makes this result applicable to
the mentioned one-step HJBI min-max problems where
in general the smoothness of the value function cannot
be guaranteed in advance; see Theorem 4. Also, the pa-
per introduces a multi-stage game model to study intel-
ligent jamming attacks on linear control systems.
The paper is organized as follows. A general controller-
jammer ANC game and its connections with intelli-
gent jamming models are presented in Section 2. The
conditions for the one-step ANC game to have a non-
pure saddle point are presented in Section 3. First we
present a general sufficient condition suitable for anal-
ysis of general multi-input networked control systems.
We then show that in the case of single-input systems
they are in fact necessary and sufficient (under an ad-
ditional smoothness assumption). Next, in Section 4
we demonstrate applications of these results to three
linear-quadratic static problems. In one of these prob-
lems, which is an extension of the problem in [10], the
jammer is offered an additional reward for undertaking
actions concealing its presence. In another problem,
the jammer’s actions take into account the cost the
controller must pay to mitigate the jammer’s presence
should the jammer reveal itself. The third problem re-
visits the problem in [6]. Section 5 generalizes some of
the results of Section 3 about the existence of saddle-
point strategies to the case of multistage ANC games;
this generalization requires the plant to be linear. The
Appendix (Section 7) contains proofs of the results.
Conclusions are given in Section 6.
Notation Rn is the n-dimensional Euclidean space of
real vectors, Rn+ is the cone in R
n consisting of vec-
tors whose all components are non-negative. The unit
simplex in RN is denoted SN−1; i.e., SN−1 = {p ∈
RN : 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1,
∑N
j=1 pj = 1}. |F | is the cardinal-
ity of a finite set F . δi,j is the Kronecker symbol, i.e.,
δi,j = 1 if i = j, otherwise δi,j = 0. For two sets M ,
U , M\U = {x ∈M : x 6∈ U}. The symbol Pr(·) denotes
probability of an event, and Pr(A|z) denotes the condi-
tional probability of an event A given z.
2 Adversarial Network Control Games
2.1 The general system setup
We consider a general setup, within which the evolution
of a plant controlled over a communication link subject
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to adversarial interference is described by a mapping
Rn × Rm → Rn,
xt+1 = Ft(x
t, vt), (1)
describing the response of the plant, when it is at state
xt, to an actuator signal vt at time t. The actuator signal
is determined by the controller who transmits control
packets over a randomly varying communication link.
The link can operate in one of several transmission
regimes, and randomly switches between them. The
mechanism of the regime switching is controlled by a
strategic jammer, unbeknownst to the controller. For
simplicity, we identify the set of transmission regimes
with the set of integers, so that F = {1, . . . , |F |}. Once
the link updates its transmission regime, it randomly
assumes either the passing or blocking state. Thus, the
transmission state of the communication link is a binary
randomvariable bt, taking values 0 and 1 associatedwith
blocking and passing control packets, and vt = btut.
Evolution of the system over a time interval {0, . . . , T } is
captured by a bivariate stochastic process {(xt, st)}Tt=0,
with the state space X = Rn×F . We now describe the
dynamics of this bivariate process.
The initial state. Initially, at time t = 0 the plant is
at a state x0 = x0, and the initial transmission regime
of the communication link is s0 = s. It is assumed that
at the time when the controller and the attacker make
their decisions, both of them know the current state of
the plant and the transmission regime of the link. In
accordance with this assumption, they know x0, s0.
State updates. The system state and the transmission
regime of the communication link are updated at every
time t, in response to controller’s and jammer’s actions,
as described below.
Controller actions. At every time instant t = 0, . . . , T −
1, the controller observes the current system state xt and
the transmission regime st of the communication link.
Based on this information, it generates a control input
ut ∈ Rm and sends it via the communication link.
Jammer actions. At every time step t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
the jammer observes the plant state xt, the transmission
regime of the communication link st, and the control
signal ut. Using this information, the jammer selects a
matrix from a predefined finite set of row stochastic ma-
trices Pt = {P t(a) ∈ R|F |×|F | : a ∈ A = {1, . . . , N}}.
That is, its action at is to draw a matrix P t(at) ∈ Pt.
Communication link update. After the jammer has cho-
sen its action at = a and the corresponding row stochas-
tic matrix P t(a), the transmission regime of the link
changes from st to st+1 according to aMarkov chain with
F as a state space and P t(at) = P t(a) as the transition
probability matrix, i.e.,
Pr(st+1 = i|st = j, at = a) = P tji(a) i, j ∈ F . (2)
The initial probability distribution of this Markov chain
reflects that the initial transmission regime is given to
be s0 = s, i.e., Pr(s0 = i) = δi,s, i ∈ F .
After the communication link randomly switches to the
transmission regime st+1 ∈ F , the transmission state
of the link is determined randomly and, given st+1, it is
conditionally independent of the previous transmission
regimes, the current and past states of the plant and
the controller’s and jammer’s actions. Thus, the proba-
bility of the link to become passing is determined by a
stochastic kernel qt on {0, 1} given F :
qtj = q
t(bt = 1|j),Pr(bt = 1|st+1 = j), j ∈ F . (3)
We denote qt , (qt1, . . . , q
t
|F |)
′. It is worth noting that
the pair of processes (st+1, bt)T−1t=0 form a controlled hid-
den Markov process, with F and {0, 1} as its the state
space and the output alphabet, respectively, {δs0,j , j ∈
F} as its initial probability distribution, the sequence of
matrices {P t(at)}T−1t=0 as the sequence of state transition
probability matrices, and the the sequence of stochastic
kernels {qt}T−1t=0 on {0, 1} given F as the output proba-
bilities. This hidden Markov process is denoted M .
Plant state updates. Next, the plant state is updated ac-
cording to (1), in response to control ut and the jammer’s
action at. Specifically, the transmission state of the link
between the controller and the plant is determined by
the binary random variable bt, whose probability distri-
bution given (xt, st), ut and at can now be expressed as
Pr(bt = 1|st= j, at= a, xt= x, ut= u) = (P t(a)qt)j ,(4)
Pr(bt = 0|st = j, at = a) = 1− (P t(c, a)qt)j . (5)
Then the actuator signal vt becomes vt = btut, and
according to (1), the plant’s new state becomes xt+1.
Proposition 1 Given a sequence of controller’s and
jammer’s actions, the joint state-link process {xt, st}Tt=0
is a Markov process.
The proof of this and all subsequent propositions is de-
ferred to the Appendix.
The transition probability measure of the Markov pro-
cess {xt, st}Tt=0 defines a sequence of stochastic kernels
on X , given u ∈ Rm, and a ∈ A ,
Qt+1(Λ × S|x, j, u, a)
= Pr(xt+1 ∈ Λ, st+1 ∈ S|xt = x, st = j, ut = u, at = a)
=
∑
i∈S
P tji(a)
[
qtiχΛ(Ft(x, u)) + (1− q
t
i)χΛ(Ft(x, 0))
]
(6)
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for t = 0, . . . , T − 1; here Λ, S are Borel subsets of Rn,
F respectively, and χΛ(·) is the indicator function of
the set Λ. The expectation with respect to the kernel
Qt(·|x, s, u, a) will be denoted Et[·|x, s, u, a].
2.2 An adversarial network control game
We now consider a zero-sum stochastic game associated
with the described setup. Its main components are:
• The set X = Rn ×F as the state space of the game;
• the sets Rm and A as action spaces for the controller
and the jammer, respectively.
• The sequence of stochastic kernels (6) on X given
X ×Rm×A and the Markov process {(xt, st)}Tt=0 as-
sociated with given sequences of controller’s and jam-
mer’s actions.
• A real-valued finite horizon cost
Υ
(
{xt}Tt=0, {u
t}T−1t=0
)
=
T−1∑
t=0
σt(xt, ut)+σT (xT ). (7)
The stage cost σt(xt, ut) in (7) symbolizes the perfor-
mance loss incurred by the system (1) when the con-
trol ut is applied to the system while it is in state xt.
In the absence of the jammer, the controller would be
expected to minimize this loss.
• A real-valued function representing the cost of jam-
mer’s actions at, t = 0, . . . , T :
Γ({at}T−1t=0 , {s
t}T−1t=0 ) =
T−1∑
t=0
gt(at, st). (8)
It describes how the jammer’s resources and incen-
tives are affected, when it takes its actions to control
the communication link. The stage cost gt(at, st) in
(8) symbolizes the cost incurred by the jammer when
at time t it selects P t(at) as a state transition prob-
ability matrix for the Markov process M . Normally,
the jammer would be expected to minimize this cost.
• A total cost of the controller’s and jammer’s actions
Σ
(
{xt}Tt=0, {u
t}T−1t=0 , {a
t}T−1t=0
)
= Υ
(
{xt}Tt=0, {u
t}T−1t=0
)
− Γ
(
{at}T−1t=0 , {s
t−1}Tt=0
)
. (9)
The minus sign in (9) indicates that degrading the
control performance comes at a cost to the jammer,
who must spend its resources to achieve its goals.
In what follows we consider a class of control input se-
quences {ut}Tt=0 and a class of jammer’s strategies con-
sisting of sequences {pt}T−1t=0 of probability vectors p
t
over A . Associated with every such sequence of the con-
troller’s and jammer’s strategies {ut}T−1t=0 , {p
t}T−1t=0 and
system and link initial conditions x0, s0 is a probabil-
ity distribution on the space of sequences of system and
communication link states endowed with the σ-algebra
of all Borel subsets 1
Qu,p(dx1 . . . , dxT , s1, . . . , sT |x0, s0)
= Qu,p1 (dx1,s1|x0, s0) . . . Q
u,p
T (dxT ,sT |xT−1,sT−1), (10)
generated by the sequence of stochastic kernels
Qu,pt+1(dx, s|x, j) =
∑
a∈A
ptaQt+1(dx, s|x, j, u
t, a), (11)
where Qt is the stochastic kernel defined in (6). The ex-
pectation with respect to the probability measure Qu,p
will be denoted Eu,p. We will omit the superscripts u,p
when this does not lead to a confusion.
Definition 1 The zero-sum stochastic game with the
state spaceX , action spaces Rm for the controller andA
for the jammer, the stochastic kernels {Qt, t = 0, . . . , T }
defined in (6) and the payoff function Σ is called the ad-
versarial networked control (ANC) game associated with
the Markov process {(xt, st)}Tt=0 and costs (7), (8), (9).
For a given plant initial condition x0 = x and an ini-
tial transmission regime of the link s0 = s, solving the
ANC game requires one to find (if they exist) strategies
for the jammer p∗ = {(p∗)t}T−1t=0 and for the controller
u∗ = {(u∗)t}T−1t=0 such that
Eu,p
∗ [
Σ
(
{xt}Tt=0, {(u
∗)t}T−1t=0 , {a
t}T−1t=0
)]
= inf
{ut}T−1
t=0
sup
{pt}T−1
t=0
Eu,p
[
Σ
(
{xt}Tt=0, {u
t}T−1t=0 , {a
t}T−1t=0
)]
= sup
{pt}T−1
t=0
inf
{ut}T−1
t=0
Eu,p
[
Σ
(
{xt}Tt=0, {u
t}T−1t=0 , {a
t}T−1t=0
)]
.
(12)
2.3 Additional comments and special cases
2.3.1 Relation to conventional DoS attacks on commu-
nications
In the model presented in Section 2.1, the adversary
controls information transmission strategically and indi-
rectly, unbeknownst to the controller.Themotivation for
introducing the indirect jamming model is to reduce the
possibility of attack detection by adding intelligence to
jamming strategy and attempting to force the controller
to believe that performance degradation is due to poor
link conditions and not due to the presence of the attack,
i.e., our model is consistent with objectives of intelligent
Denial-of-Service jamming [14]. We now present two in-
telligent jamming scenarios which our model captures.
1 In (10), xt is an arbitrary vector in Rn, in contrast to the
state xt of the plant at time t. Likewise, st is an integer in
F , in contrast to the random state st of the Markov process
M with values in F .
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Fig. 1. An attack by re-routing control packets. The jammer
strategically selects a binary channel which randomly blocks
or passes transmission of control information from the con-
troller to the plant.
An attack by re-routing. In this scenario, the controller
and the plant are connected by amulti-hop network (i.e.,
a graph), with each transmission regime corresponding
to a path connecting the controller and the plant ver-
tices in that graph. Assuming that the graph is acyclic,
the set of such paths has finite (yet possibly large) cardi-
nality, so it can be modeled by our set F . When a jam-
mer intercepts a message at a vertex and re-routes it on
an outgoing edge of its choosing it, essentially, modifies
the characteristics (packet-drop rate, delay, etc.) of the
communication channel experienced by the controller.
It can thus, in effect, be thought of as controlling the
characteristics of a communication channel or as ‘switch-
ing’ channels. Accordingly, the jammer can be thought
of having the action set A = F , and the row stochas-
tic matrices (2) describing changes of the transmission
regimes in this example are defined as
P tji(a) =
{
1, if i = a,
0, if i 6= a,
(13)
i.e., the control information is transmitted through the
channel selected by the jammer.
The controller may know the previous channel used for
transmission (e.g., from an acknowledgement from the
plant), and therefore in general its decision ut can de-
pend on st. However, even though the controller has
knowledge about the previously used channel and can
use this knowledge to select a channel which it wants to
use, the attacker overrules this selection and redirects
control packets through a different channel. The actual
mechanism through which (re)routing, and the ensuing
‘switching’, is performed in the network is not impor-
tant for our purposes. All that matters is that jammer’s
actions eventually affect the row stochastic matrix de-
scribing transmission, as (13) shows. In that sense, the
picture in Fig. 1 is a good metaphor (it is not an exact
technical description) of the jamming process.
Letting the jammer select the channel randomly, accord-
ing to a probability vector pt = (pt1, . . . , p
t
N )
′ overF will
allow it to control the probability of packet dropouts,
since in this case
Pr(bt = 1|st = j) = (pt)′qt. (14)
As a result, the end-to-end statistical characteristics of
the communication link depend on the jammer’s selec-
tion of the probability distribution pt but are indepen-
dent of the past channel st known to the controller.
Hence, such characteristics are difficult for the controller
to predict. Implications of this observation will be con-
sidered in detail in the next sections.
An attack by modifying channel characteristics. Where
there is a single physical channel between the controller
and the plant, the adversary can interfere with transmis-
sion by means of intercepting control packets and ‘filter-
ing’ them through one of several binary automata avail-
able to it. Each ‘filter’-automaton determines the trans-
mission regime in this case. Indeed, let again A = F
and let P tji(a) be defined as in (13). Then the probability
for the link to become passing when the jammer selects
automaton at = i becomes the function of the jammer’s
action, since according to (4) we have:
Pr(bt = 1|st = j, at = i) = qti = Pr(b
t = 1|at = st+1 = i).
Again, we see that this probability does not depend on
the transmission regime st utilized at the previous time
step but depends on the jammer’s action. As in the pre-
vious attackmodel considered, the end-to-end statistical
characteristics of the communication link depend on the
jammer’s actions and hence are difficult for the controller
to predict. Letting the jammer select its actions accord-
ing to a probability distribution pt = (pt1, . . . , p
t
N)
′ will
allow it to exercise even greater control over the distri-
bution of bt, according to (14).
In this scenario, since the transmission regimes are fully
controlled by the jammer, the controller is unlikely to
be able to observe past jammer’s actions. In view of this
restriction, the controller’s feasible strategies are limited
to state feedback strategies ut = ut(xt), which are a
special case of more general control strategies dependent
on st mentioned earlier.
In both attack scenarios presented above, direct jam-
ming has been forsaken in favour of intelligently control-
ling the probability of control packets delivery. As was
mentioned, a direct control over transmission was shown
in [6] to result in a deterministically predictable jam-
ming strategy. We will show in this paper that the pro-
posed intelligent jamming strategies lead to a distinctly
different jammer behaviour while forcing the controller
to respond in a manner distinct from what one would
expect in the situation where packet loss is benign.
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2.3.2 Strategy spaces
In the ANC game (12), an optimal jammer’s strategy
is sought in the set of mixed strategies, i.e., probability
distributions on A . On the other hand, the controller
does not use mixed strategies. Indeed, in a number of
control problems considering benign loss of communica-
tion, optimal control laws are sought in the class of lin-
ear non-randomized functions of the (estimated) state of
the plant; e.g, see [3]. It is this sort of situation that we
consider as a target for stealthy intelligent jamming —
unless the controller knows that the system is under at-
tack, it has no reason to deviate from its optimal policy.
2.3.3 The actuation model and control information
The proposed actuation model assumes that when the
link drops control packets, the actuator signal vt is set to
0. The ‘hold’ situation where vt is set to the last received
control signal u− whenever ut is dropped, can be reduced
to this case by the change of control variables.
Our control model includes feedback controls that use
the full information about the state of the underlying
Markov process M . In practice, it may not always be
possible for the controller to observe this state; the sec-
ond example in Section 2.3.1 alludes to such situation.
Games with partial information are known to be much
more difficult to solve, and the existence of a saddle point
is more difficult to establish if possible at all. Consider-
ing a larger class of controllers which includes Markov
control laws allows us to circumvent this difficulty, and
obtain conditions under which the ANC game has an
equilibrium (as will be shown, under these conditions,
the controller’s optimal response is indeed Markov). The
upper value of this game then sets the lower bound on
control performance which can be achieved when, for in-
stance, the controller is agnostic about the transmission
characteristics of the communication link.
3 Static ANC games
3.1 One-stage ANC games
Our aim is to determine conditions under which an ANC
game admits non-pure saddle points. By non-pure sad-
dle point we mean a saddle point of the game (12) con-
sisting of sequences of non-pure strategy vectors (p∗)t,
each being a linear combination of two or more vertices
of the simplex SN−1, and the corresponding controller’s
best responses (u∗)t. As demonstrated in Section 2.3.1,
non-pure policies allow the attacker to exercise an intel-
ligent DoS jamming by randomizing its actions and con-
trolling the probability of control packet transmission.
To facilitate characterization of non-pure ANC saddle-
point strategies, in this section we consider one-stage
ANC games which can be regarded as a special case of
the ANC game (12) played over a one time step horizon.
To emphasize the one-stage nature of the game, we tem-
porarily suppress the time variable t, and adopt a sim-
plified notation, where the variables current at time t
are not indexed, while the variables which are updated
and become current at time t + 1 are marked with the
superscript +. With this convention, a one-step version
of the general model presented in Section 2 involves:
• A plant initial state x and an initial transmission
regime of the communication link s, which captures
characteristics of the link between the controller and
the plant before the jamming attack is undertaken.
• Controller and jammer actions u and a, with a selected
according to a probability distribution p over A .
• A transmission mode s+ of the link, randomly drawn
from F according to the probability distribution
Ps,·(a) corresponding to the s-th row of the matrix
P (a) selected by the jammer; see (2).
• The probability of the link operating in the transmis-
sion regime s+ ∈ F to become passing, determined
by equation (3). The vector of these probabilities is
denoted q = (q1, . . . , q|F |)
′.
• The binary random variable b capturing the transmis-
sion state of the communication link at the time of
plant state update. According to (4), when the jam-
mer’s actions have a distribution p, the probability of
the link to become passing is
∑N
a=1 pa(P (c, a)q)s.
• The updated state of the plant x+, which is the termi-
nal plant state in the one-stage ANC game. From (1),
x+ = F (x, bu). (15)
• The payoff function associated with the controller’s
and jammer’s actions and the given initial system
state x and the link transmission regime s,
Σ(x+, u, a) = σ0(x, u) + σ1(x+)− g0(a, s). (16)
The latter is a special case of the payoff (9).
In the one-step case, the probability measure (10) re-
duces to the conditional probabilitymeasure onX given
that the plant starts at x and the link is initiated at an
initial transmission regime s
Qu,p(dx+, s+|x, s) =
N∑
a=1
paPss+(a)
[
qs+δ(x
+ − F (x, u))
+ (1 − qs+)δ(x
+ − F (x, 0))
]
dx+. (17)
Definition 2 The one-stage ANC game is to find (if
they exist) a strategy for the jammer p∗ ∈ SN−1 and a
feedback strategy for the controller u∗ such that
Eu
∗,p∗Σ(x+, u∗, a) = J1 = J2, (18)
where J1 and J2 are the upper and the lower values of the
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game,
J1 = inf
u∈Rm
sup
p∈SN−1
Eu,pΣ(x+, u, a), (19)
J2 = sup
p∈SN−1
inf
u∈Rm
Eu,pΣ(x+, u, a). (20)
The pair (u∗, p∗) is then a saddle point of the game.
We wish to determine whether the ANC game has non-
pure saddle points. As was explained earlier, such saddle
points signify a possibility for the jammer to randomly
choose between several actions as its optimal strategy.
3.2 Existence of a saddle point in one-stage ANC games
Our result on the existence of an equilibrium of the one-
stage game (18) relies on the following assumption.
Assumption 1 For every x ∈ Rn, a ∈ A , the func-
tions Σ(F (x, 0), ·, a) and Σ(F (x, ·), ·, a) are continuous,
coercive 2 and convex functions Rm → R.
According to (17), the expected cost in (18) has the form
Eu,pΣ(x+, u, a) = p′hx,s(u), (21)
where hx,s(·) is a vector function Rm → RN , whose i-
th component represents the conditional expected cost
value given a jamming action a = i:
hx,si (u) =E
u,p[Σ(x+, u, a)|a = i]
= (P (i)q)sΣ(F (x, u), u, i)
+(1− (P (i)q)s)Σ(F (x, 0), u, i). (22)
Under Assumption 1, each function hx,si (·) is continuous,
convex and coercive for every s ∈ F and x ∈ Rn.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, for every initial pair
(x, s), the one-stage ANC game has a finite value, i.e.,
−∞ < J1 = J2 <∞, and the game has a (possibly non-
unique) saddle point. Furthermore, for every x, there ex-
ists a compact set U(x) ⊂ Rm which contains the con-
troller’s optimal response u∗ = u∗(x, s) and is such that
J1 = inf
u∈U(x)
sup
p∈SN−1
Eu,pΣ(x+, u, a) (23)
= sup
p∈SN−1
inf
u∈U(x)
Eu,pΣ(x+, u, a) = J2. (24)
Unlike standard results on the existence of a saddle point
in a static zero-sum convex-concave game [9], the strat-
egy space of the minimizer is not bounded in the game
2 Recall that a function h : Rm → R is coercive if there
exists a function η : R+ → R such that limy→+∞ η(y) = +∞
and h(u) ≥ η(‖u‖) for all u ∈ Rm.
(19), (20). Theorem 1 shows that the minimization over
u ∈ Rm in (19) and (20) can be reduced to a minimiza-
tion over a compact set. According to (24), every saddle
point of the static game played on U(x) × SN−1 is a
saddle point of the game played on Rm ×SN−1.
3.3 General sufficient conditions for the existence of
optimal non-pure jammer strategies
Theorem 1 asserts the existence of a saddle-point strat-
egy for the ANC game (18). However, it does not answer
the question as to whether the jammer’s corresponding
strategy is randomized or not, which is of central im-
portance for a possibility of intelligent jamming attacks.
To answer this question, we now provide sufficient and,
under additional technical assumptions, necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of non-pure saddle
points in the ANC game (18). These conditions charac-
terize the controller-jammer games in which the jammer
randomizes its choice of optimal strategies. As we will
see in Section 4, this will force the controller to respond
in a non-obvious manner in order to remain optimal.
Lemma 1 Let H = [H1, . . . , HN ]
′ be a convex vector-
valued function Rm → RN (i.e., each component of H is
a convex function). Assume there exist u∗ ∈ Rm and a
set G ⊂ A with |G | ≥ 2 such that
(a) Hi(u
∗) = max1≤j≤N Hj(u
∗) for all i ∈ G .
(b) For all u 6= u∗, there exists i ∈ G such that Hi(u) >
Hi(u
∗).
(c) u∗ is not a minimum of any Hi, i ∈ G .
Then, there exists a non-pure vector p∗ ∈ SN−1, with
support I(p∗) ⊆ G such that
inf
u∈Rm
sup
p∈SN−1
p′H(u) = (p∗)′H(u∗) = sup
p∈SN−1
inf
u∈Rm
p′H(u).
Our first result about the ANC game (18) now follows.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and for ev-
ery x ∈ Rn, s ∈ F , the function H(u) , hx,s(u) =
[hx,s1 (u), . . . , h
c,s
N (u)]
′ satisfies conditions (a)-(c) of
Lemma 1; i.e., there exist u∗ and a set G ⊂ A for which
conditions (a)-(c) hold. Then the static ANC game (18)
has a non-pure saddle point (u∗, p∗).
Theorem 2 asserts the existence of a non-pure saddle
point in the one-stage game under consideration. The
jammer can use Theorem 2 to assess whether it can
launch a randomized jamming attack, as follows. The
jammer observes the state of the system (x, s) and the
control signal u, then checks whether u belongs to the set
U
s,x = {u∗ : ∃G ⊆ A , |G | ≥ 2, s.t. H(u∗) = hx,s(u∗)
verifies conditions of Lemma 1}.
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If u ∈ U s,x and the corresponding set G exists, the jam-
mer can launch an attack by randomly selecting a ∈
G , according to an arbitrary probability distribution p∗
supported on G (it is shown in the proof of Lemma 1
that any such vector can serve as the jammer’s best re-
sponse; see Appendix). The controller also can carry out
a similar analysis if it knows the state of the system
(x, s) and the set A , to determine whether the control
input u it has chosen can trigger a randomized jamming
behaviour. For this, the controller must verify whether
u ∈ U s,x. When the controller does not know the trans-
mission regime s, then a conservative test can be per-
formed to check whether u ∈ ∪sU
s,x. Neither the jam-
mer nor the controller need to compute their optimal
strategies to perform this analysis. In the remainder of
this Section and in Section 4, we will further particular-
ize conditions of Theorem 2, to provide a better insight
into how Theorem 2 enables such an analysis.
Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 make no assumption regard-
ing the smoothness of the function H , which is useful
for application to dynamic ANC games, where the game
(19), (20) may arise as an Isaacs equation from applica-
tion of the Dynamic Programming. The value function
in such an equation may not be smooth (e.g., in [10]
it was shown to be only piece-wise smooth). However,
Theorem 2 can be sharpened when local differentiability
holds. This will be demonstrated in the next section.
3.4 Necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic
jamming
The analysis in this section requires control inputs u
to be one-dimensional, and the functions hx,si (·), i ∈
G must be piece-wise smooth. Furthermore, we assume
that the set G consists of only two actions, G = {a1, a2}.
Assumption 2 Suppose the space of control inputs is
one-dimensional. Also, for every x ∈ Rn, a ∈ A , the
functions Σ(F (x, ·), ·, a) and Σ(F (x, 0), ·, a) are convex
functions defined on R1, which are continuously differen-
tiable on R1, perhaps with the exception of a finite num-
ber of points; let Ud(x) be the set of such points.
Clearly, under Assumption 2, the functions hx,sa1 (·),
hx,sa2 (·) are convex. Also, these functions are continu-
ously differentiable at every u, except for u ∈ Ud.
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumption 2 holds.
(i) If for every x, s, there exists u¯ 6∈ Ud such that
hx,sa1 (u¯) = h
x,s
a2
(u¯), (25)
hx,si (u¯) ≥ h
x,s
a (u¯), ∀i ∈ G , a 6∈ G , (26)
and one of the following conditions hold: either(
dhx,sa1 (u¯)
du
)(
dhc,sa2 (u¯)
du
)
< 0, (27)
PSfrag replacements
u¯u0
hx,sa1
hx,sa2
(a)
PSfrag replacements
u¯
u0
hx,sa1
hx,sa2
(b)
Fig. 2. Graphs of the functions hx,sa1 (·), h
x,s
a2
(·) in Theorem 3.
In Fig. (a), u¯ satisfies conditions (25) and (27), but u0 does
not satisfy (27). In Fig. (b), u¯ satisfies both (25) and (28).
or
dhx,sa1 (u¯)
du
=
dhx,sa2 (u¯)
du
= 0, (28)
then the zero-sum game (19) admits a non-pure
saddle point (u∗, p∗), u∗ 6∈ Ud, with p∗ supported
on G = {a1, a2}.
(ii) Conversely, if the zero-sum game (19) admits a
non-pure saddle point (u∗, p∗), u∗ 6∈ Ud, with p∗
supported on G = {a1, a2}, then there exists u¯ 6∈ U
d
such that either (25), (27) or (25), (28) hold.
The conditions of Theorem 3 are illustrated in Figure 2.
We note that conditions (25), (26) are a special case of
condition (a) of Theorem 2. Also, it will be shown in the
proof of this theorem in the Appendix that conditions
(b) and (c) of Theorem 2 follow from condition (27) when
hx,sa1 (·) and h
x,s
a2
(·) are smooth and strictly convex.On the
other hand, condition (28) was ruled out in Theorem 2;
see condition (c) in that theorem. Indeed, conditions (27)
and (28) are mutually exclusive.
3.5 Rewarding certain actions leads to randomized jam-
ming strategies
Attacker’s decisions to pass/block transmission of con-
trol information may be based on considerations other
than cost to the controller. These considerations encoded
in the jamming cost g0(a, s) in (16) may either discour-
age the jammer from launching an attack, or conversely
encourage it to undertake a denial-of-service attack. The
cost of link switching may be one consideration behind
the jammer’s decisions whether to launch an attack.
Also, the jammer may be rewarded for being inactive to
ensure it is not detected; e.g., this situation may occur
when the controller monitors the communication link,
and an anomaly in the link behaviour can reveal the jam-
mer. In this section we show that when the attacker is
rewarded for undertaking certain actions, a set G con-
sidered in Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 arises naturally.
Most generally, the reward scenario can be captured by
reserving special actions in the jammer’s action space
A ; such actions will typically attract a distinctly differ-
ent cost. For simplicity let a◦ be the only reserved ac-
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tion. Next, suppose the remaining actions are ranked in
accordance with their contribution to the game payoff.
Assumption 3 For any two actions j, k ∈ A , j, k 6= a◦,
if j < k then for all u ∈
◦
U(x)
Eu,p[Σ(x+, u, a)|a = j] > Eu,p[Σ(x+, u, a)|a = k], (29)
here
◦
U(x) is the interior of the compact set U(x) from
Theorem 1.
Under Assumption 3, the jammer who seeks a higher
value of the gamewill favour actions with lower numbers,
since these actions generate larger payoff. In contrast,
the controller should be forcing the jammer into utilizing
actions with higher numbers. The reserved action a◦ has
been excluded from ranking. Doing so is instrumental
to provide the jammer with a genuine choice between
taking the reward and blocking/passing transmission.
We now show that using the action ranking from As-
sumption 3, the value and the saddle points of the game
(19) can be characterized by solving a game over a re-
duced jammer’s action space G consisting of the reserved
action a◦ and one of the remaining actions which delivers
the highest payoff to the jammer when it seeks to block
communications between the controller and the plant.
Note that when a◦ 6= 1, then according to (29), the jam-
mer’s highest payoff among ‘regular’ (i.e., not reserved)
actions is associated with action a = 1. Alternatively, if
a◦ = 1, then according to (29), the highest payoff among
the actions from A \{a◦} is delivered when the jammer
selects a = 2. In both cases, the reduced action space
will contain only two actions from A ; in the first case,
G = {1, a◦}, or G = {1, 2} in the second case. The anal-
ysis of the reduced game is the same in both cases, there-
fore we only consider the case G = {1, a◦}. In Section 4,
detailed examples will be given to illustrate this case.
Now that the set G has been established, the existence
of non-pure strategies in the ANC game with reserved
actions can be derived from the results in the previous
section. The first result is a corollary from Theorem 2
and is applicable when the control input is a vector.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Fur-
thermore, suppose that for given initial x, s there exists
u∗ = u∗(x, s) ∈
◦
U such that the functions hx,s1 (·), h
x,s
a◦
(·)
satisfy the conditions
(a) hx,s1 (u
∗) = hx,sa◦ (u
∗);
(b) For all u 6= u∗, hx,s1 (u) > h
x,s
1 (u
∗) or hx,sa◦ (u) >
hx,sa◦ (u
∗);
(c) u∗ is not a minimum of hx,s1 (·), h
x,s
a◦
(·).
Then, the zero-sun game (19), (20) admits a non-pure
saddle point (u∗, p∗) with non-pure vector p∗ supported
on G = {1, a◦}.
Proof: Under Assumption 3, hx,s1 (u
∗) > hx,sk (u
∗) ∀k 6∈
{1, a◦}. Together with condition (a), this observation
verifies condition (a) of Lemma 1, with G = {1, a◦}.
Conditions (b) and (c) of that lemma trivially follow
from (b) and (c) in this corollary. Thus, from Lemma 1,
the ANC game has a saddle point (u∗, p∗) with p∗ sup-
ported on I(p∗) ⊆ G . Since |G | = 2, and p∗ is not pure,
then |I(p∗)| = 2, i.e, 0 < p∗1 < 1 and 0 < p
∗
a◦
< 1. ✷
The second corollary follows from Theorem 3 and ap-
plies when the control input is scalar. It eliminates con-
dition (26) which is the gap between the necessity and
sufficiency statements in that theorem.
Corollary 2 Suppose Assumptions 2, 3 hold. The zero-
sum game (19) admits a non-pure saddle point (u∗, p∗),
u∗ 6∈ Ud, with p∗ supported on G = {1, a◦}, if and only if
there exists u¯ ∈
◦
U(x)\Ud satisfying (25) and either (27)
or (28) with a1 = 1 and a2 = a◦.
Proof: The corollary directly follows from Theorem 3
since condition (26) of the sufficiency part of that theo-
rem is trivially satisfied under Assumption 3.
3.6 Remarks on the single-stage payoff
The foregoing analysis of the single-stage ANC game
(19) has relied on the properties of conditional pay-
off functions hx,si (·) = E
u,p[Σ(x+, ·, a)|a = i] which in
turn follow from coercivity, convexity and continuity of
Σ(F (x, ·), ·, a) and Σ(F (x, 0), ·, a). Of course these prop-
erties can be readily validated from the corresponding
properties of σ0 and σ1 through (16). However, we stress
that the results in this section are in fact more general in
that they apply to functions Σ more general than (16);
this observation will be useful in the next section.
4 Linear-quadratic controller-jammer games
In this section, we specialize the results of Section 3
to one-stage controller-jammer ANC games where the
plant (1) is linear, and hence (15) becomes
x+ = Ax+ bBu, (30)
and the cost of control is quadratic. Also, we give ex-
amples of the situations alluded in Section 3, where re-
warding certain actions leads to randomized jamming.
Two such games will be considered. In the first game
the jammer is rewarded for remaining stealthy, while in
the second game its decisions are determined by the pre-
mium the controller must pay for terminating the game
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(e.g., as a cost of repair or cost of re-routing control sig-
nals). We show that in both games, there is a region in
the plant state space where the jammer’s optimal pol-
icy is to randomize among its actions, and an optimal
control response to this jamming policy is nonlinear. We
will also revisit the game from [6] and will show that the
deterministically predictable behaviour of the jammer
observed in [6] can be predicted using our results.
In order to provide a clear context of the attack strategies
resulting from these games we revisit the intelligent DoS
by re-routing; see Section 2.3.1. That is, we assume that
the jammer’s actions are to randomly select one of the
available communication channels, i.e., A = F , and
P (a) is defined as in (13). In addition, we will assume
that u ∈ R1; this will allow us to apply Theorem 3 and,
under Assumption 3, Corollary 2.
Thanks to the linear-quadratic nature of the games, in
all three problems the conditional expected payoff (22),
given the jammer’s action a = j, will have the form 3
hj(u) = γj(x) + u
2 + rjqju(u+ 2β(x)), (31)
where rj ≥ 0 is a constant, and γj(x) ≥ 0 for all j.
Also, all available channels are assumed to be ordered
according to their probability to become passing, that
is, the probabilities (3) are assumed to be ordered as
q1 < q2 < . . . < qn. (32)
Lemma 2 The set U(x) = {u : u(u + 2β(x)) ≤ 0}
verifies properties stated in Theorem 1. Also, let a◦ 6= 1
denote a reserved action, and suppose rj = r > 0 and
γj(x) = γ(x) for all j 6= a◦. Then under condition (32),
Assumption 3 is also satisfied with U(x) defined above.
Proof: We fix x and assume β(x) > 0. The case β(x) <
0 can be analyzed in a similar manner, while the case
β(x) = 0 is trivial.
The functions hj(u) defined in (31) are continuous and
strictly convex in u. They are monotone decreasing on
the interval (−∞,−2β(x)] and are monotone increasing
on the interval [0,+∞). Therefore, hˆ(u) = maxj hj(u)
and h¯(u) =
∑
j pjhj(u) are also monotone decreasing on
the interval (−∞,−2β(x)] and are monotone increasing
on [0,+∞). Since both functions are continuous,
min
u≤−2β(x)
hˆ(u) = hˆ(−2β(x)), min
u≥0
hˆ(u) = hˆ(0),
min
u≤−2β(x)
h¯(u) = h¯(−2β(x)), min
u≥0
h¯(u) = h¯(0).
3 The superscript x,s is suppressed in this section, for econ-
omy of notation.
Therefore, since the set U(x) is closed and contains the
points 0 and −2β(x), then
inf
u
sup
p∈SN−1
h¯(u) = inf
u
hˆ(u)
=min
[
inf
u≤−2β(x)
hˆ(u), inf
u∈U(x)
hˆ(u), inf
u≥0
hˆ(u)
]
= inf
u∈U(x)
hˆ(u) = inf
u∈U(x)
sup
p∈SN−1
h¯(u).
Also, for every p ∈ SN−1, infu h¯(u) is attained at
u = −
∑
j
pjrjqj
1+
∑
j
pjrjqj
β(x) ∈ U(x), therefore inf
u
h¯(u) =
inf
u∈U(x)
h¯(u) and sup
p∈SN−1
inf
u
h¯(u) = sup
p∈SN−1
inf
u∈U(x)
h¯(u).
This proves that an optimal response of the minimiz-
ing player in the game (19) lies within the interval
[−2β(x), 0].
To verify the second claim of the lemma, we note that
for any j, k 6= a◦ if j > k then due to (32) hj(u) < hk(u)
for all u ∈ (−2β(x), 0) i.e., (29) is satisfied. ✷
4.1 LQ control under reward for stealthiness
Consider a controller-jammer game for the plant (30)
with initial conditions x0 = x and s0 = s and the
quadratic payoff (16), with σ0(x, u) = ‖x‖2 + u2,
σ1(x+) = ‖x+‖2, g0(a, s) = −τδa,s. Here, τ > 0 is the
constant payoff which the jammer receives if it does not
re-route control packets through a different channel. The
rationale here is to reward the jammer for not switch-
ing channels when excessive switching may reveal its
presence (hence rewarding stealthiness), or may drain
its resources. Thus, the reserved action is to maintain
transmission through the initial channel s, i.e., a◦ = s.
The corresponding function Σ (16) in this case is
Σ(x+, u, a) =
{
‖x‖2 + u2 + ‖x+‖2, a 6= s,
‖x‖2 + u2 + ‖x+‖2 + τ, a = s,
(33)
and the static LQ ANC game is to find a control strat-
egy u∗ and a jammer’s non-pure strategy p∗ which
form a saddle point of the game (19) for the plant
(30), with the payoff (33). We now show that Corol-
lary 2 can be used for that. Indeed, the functions
hj(u) = Eu,p[Σ(x+, u, a)|a = j] have the form (31), with
γj(x) = x
′(I +A′A)x, j 6= s γs(x) = x
′(I + A′A)x + τ ,
and β(x) = 1‖B‖2B
′Ax, rj = ‖B‖
2 for all j ∈ A . Ac-
cording to Lemma 2, with a◦ = s, Assumption 3 is
satisfied in this special case. Furthermore, Assump-
tion 2 is also satisfied, due to linearity of the plant and
a quadratic nature of the payoff. Then the analysis of
the ANC game can be reduced to verifying whether
the payoff functions for the reduced zero-sum game,
namely hx,s1 (u) = h1(u) and h
x,s
a◦
(u) = hs(u) satisfy the
conditions of Corollary 2.
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Using (31), condition (25) reduces to the equation to be
solved for u¯ ∈ (−2β(x), 0),
u¯
(
u¯+
2
‖B‖2
B′Ax
)
=
τ
‖B‖2(q1 − qs)
, (34)
which admits real solutions if 1‖B‖2x
′A′BB′Ax ≥ τ
qs−q1
.
Also, condition (27) reduces to the condition
−
‖B‖2qs
1 + ‖B‖2qs
< u¯ < −
‖B‖2q1
1 + ‖B‖2q1
. (35)
The analysis of conditions (34), (35) shows that only one
of the solutions of equation (34), namely
u¯, u∗=−
1
‖B‖2
B′Ax
(
1−
√
τ‖B‖2
(q1 − qs)x′A′BB′Ax
)
(36)
satisfies (35) provided
R1 < x
′A′BB′Ax < Rs, (37)
R1 ,
(1 + ‖B‖2q1)
2
(1 + ‖B‖2q1)2 − 1
qs − q1
τ‖B‖2
,
Rs ,
(1 + ‖B‖2qs)
2
(1 + ‖B‖2qs)2 − 1
qs − q1
τ‖B‖2
.
Condition (37) describes the region in the state space
in which the jammer’s optimal policy is to choose ran-
domly between the initial channel s and the most block-
ing channel 1. In the case where the plant (30) is scalar
and B = 1, we recover exactly the condition obtained
in [10] by direct computation. That is, Corollary 3 con-
firms the existence of the jammer’s non-pure optimal
strategy for this region. We refer the reader to [10] for
the exact value of the optimal vector p∗; the calculation
for the multidimensional plant (30) follows same lines,
and is omitted for the sake of brevity. We also point out
that the optimal controller’s policy (36) is nonlinear.
Let us now compare quadratic performance of the opti-
mal response control u∗ with performance of the optimal
guaranteed cost control law designed to control the plant
(30) over a bona fide packet dropping link with unknown
probability distribution of packet dropouts. Since the
controller is unaware of the attack and is also unaware
of the precise statistical characteristics of the channel,
such a control strategy is a natural choice. Let d denote
the unknown probability distribution of the transmis-
sion state of a packet dropping link perceived by the con-
troller. The set of all feasible probability distributions d
is denotedD. The optimal guaranteed performance con-
trol uLQR is characterized by the condition
sup
d∈D
Ed[‖x‖2 + |uLQR|2 + ‖x+‖2]
= inf
u
sup
d∈D
Ed[‖x‖2 + |u|2 + ‖x+‖2]; (38)
hereEd denotes the expectationwith respect to the prob-
ability vector d. In particular, when the link is optimally
controlled by the jammer, we have d∗ = [(p∗)′q, (1 −
(p∗)′q)]′. Hence when d∗ ∈ D, then
Eu
LQR,p∗ [‖x‖2 + |uLQR|2 + ‖x+‖2]
≤ sup
d∈D
Ed[‖x‖2 + |uLQR|2 + ‖x+‖2]
= inf
u
sup
d∈D
Ed[‖x‖2 + |u|2 + ‖x+‖2]. (39)
On the other hand, since (u∗, p∗) is the saddle point of
the one-stage min-max ANC game which we have shown
to admit the upper value, we conclude that for all u,
Eu
∗,p∗ [‖x‖2 + |u∗|2 + ‖x+‖2 + δa,sτ ]
≤Eu,p
∗
[‖x‖2 + |u|2 + ‖x+‖2 + δa,sτ ]. (40)
Drop the term Eu
∗,p∗ [δa,sτ ] = Eu,p
∗
[δa,sτ ] = p
∗
sτ on
both sides of (40), it then follows from (39), (40)
Eu
∗,p∗ [‖x‖2 + |u∗|2 + ‖x+‖2]
≤ inf
u
sup
d∈D
Ed[‖x‖2 + |u|2 + ‖x+‖2]. (41)
This argument shows that when the jammer exercises its
optimal randomized strategy, unbeknownst to the con-
troller, and forces the latter to perceive the communica-
tion link as a benign uncertain packet dropping channel,
the guaranteed cost control law designed under this as-
sumption will have an inferior performance, compared
with u∗, provided d∗ ∈ D. We interpret this situation as
a signature of a successful DoS attack by the jammer.
From the above analysis, it appears that a possible line of
defence against the DoS attack analyzed in this section
could be controlling the system so as to avoid the region
defined by (37). In this case, the jammer will be forced
to deterministically route control packets over the gen-
uine, albeit most damaging, packet dropping channel.
An impact of this defense on the system performance is
an open problem which will be studied in future work.
4.2 Linear quadratic game with cost on loss of control
We again consider the plant (30), but with the payoff
‖x‖2 + v2 + ‖x+‖2 = ‖x‖2 + b2u2 + ‖x+‖2.
This is a one-step version of the payoff considered in [6].
The payoff in this game directly depends on whether the
control input is blocked. In this case, the functions hj
have a form slightly different from those in Section 4.1:
hj(u) = x
′(I +A′A)x
+qj(1 + ‖B‖
2)u
(
u+
2
1 + ‖B‖2
B′Ax
)
.
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According to Lemma 2, Assumption 3 is still satisfied
(with the reserved action a◦ = s), and we can attempt
to apply Corollary 2. For every x 6= 0, two points solve
condition (25), u¯ = 0 and u¯ = − 21+‖B‖2B
′Ax, but none
of them satisfy conditions (27) or (28). Hence, the jam-
mer’s optimal strategy is to switch to the most blocking
channel 1, instead of randomizing between s and 1. This
finding is consistent with the result obtained in [6].
4.3 Linear-quadratic game with termination payoff
In this example, suppose the controller chooses a chan-
nel s to transmit information and receivesmessages from
the plant as to which channel was used for transmis-
sion. Once the controller detects change, it terminates
the game and pays a termination fee T , otherwise its
terminal cost is a regular state-dependent cost σ1(x+).
The jammer has a choice between disrupting that chan-
nel s and thus revealing itself, and holding off the attack
to remain undetected. The game payoff is then
Σ(x+, u, a) = ‖x‖2 + u2 + (1− δa,s)T + δa,s‖x
+‖2.
Owing to the term δa,s‖x
+‖2, this payoff is not of the
form (16), however its conditional expectation given a =
j has the form (31), with γj(x) = ‖x‖
2 + T , rj = 0,
j 6= s, γs(x) = x
′(I + A′A)x, rs = ‖B‖
2, and β(x) =
1
‖B‖2B
′Ax; it satisfies all the convexity and coercivity
conditions required in Section 3, hence the results de-
veloped in Section 3 can be applied in this problem; see
the remarks in Section 3.6. Without loss of generality,
we only consider the case where B′Ax ≤ 0. The analysis
of the case B′Ax ≥ 0 follows the same lines.
In the game considered, all the channels except s have
equal value for the jammer. Essentially, the jammer has
to choose between two actions: allow the controller to
use its chosen channel s or reveal itself by selecting some
other channel, e.g., channel 1. For that reason, we select
G = {1, s} and proceed using Theorem 3. Naturally, we
assume s 6= 1, since the case s = 1 is trivial.
According to our selection of the set G , the functions
hx,sa1 and h
x,s
a2
in Theorem 3 are h1 and hs from (31),
respectively. It can be shown that if B′Ax ≤ 0, T ≥
x′A′(I − qs‖B‖2BB
′)Ax, then
u¯ = u∗ =−
1
‖B‖2
B′Ax
+
√
‖B‖2T − x′A′(‖B‖2I − (qs)BB′)Ax
‖B‖4qs
(42)
validates conditions (25), (27) of Theorem 3 when
u¯ < 0 and (1 + ‖B‖2qs)u¯+ (qs)x
′A′B > 0. (43)
Substituting (42) into (43) yields
x′A′Ax>T, T >x′A′
(
I−
(2 + ‖B‖2qs)q
2
s
(1 + ‖B‖2qs)2
BB′
)
Ax. (44)
Note that I −
(2+‖B‖2qs)q
2
s
(1+‖B‖2qs)2
BB′ > I − qs‖B‖2BB
′ > 0.
Therefore the region in the plant’s state space where the
game has a non-pure saddle point is the intersection of
the interior of the ellipsoid defined by condition (44) and
the set {x : ‖Ax‖2 > T }. Such an intersection is clearly
not an empty set, since I −
(2+qs‖B‖
2)q2s
(1+‖B‖2qs)2
BB′ < I.
Once again, as in Section 4.1, our analysis discovers a re-
gion in the state space where the jammer’s optimal strat-
egy is to act randomly. In fact, in this problem the choice
is between allowing transmission through the channel s
selected by the controller and switching to some other
channel — no matter which channel is selected to re-
place s, the value of the game is not affected by this se-
lection. The jammer’s optimal policy vector p∗ can be
computed directly in this problem to be an arbitrary
vector in SN−1 with the s-th component being equal to
p∗s =−
1
‖B‖2qs
×
(
1−
√
(qs)x′A′Ax
‖B‖2T − x′A′(‖B‖2I − (qs)BB′)Ax
)
.(45)
Again, as in Section 4.1, the controller’s best response is
nonlinear in x.
5 Existence of saddle-point strategies for multi-
stage finite horizon ANC games
In this section we extend some of our previous results
about the existence of saddle-point strategies to the case
of the multistage ANC game (12). The game was posed
in Section 2, but our generalization will be concerned
with a special case where the function Ft is a linear func-
tion, Ft(x, v) = Atx+Btv, where At, Bt are matrices of
matching dimensions. That is, we restrict attention to
linear systems of the form
xt+1 = Atx
t + btBtu
t. (46)
Assumption 4 (i) For every t = 0, . . . , T − 1, there
exist scalars et, dt and functions αt, βt : R+ → R,
with limy→+∞ αt(y) = limy→+∞ βt(y) = +∞ and
αt(y) ≥ et, βt(y) ≥ dt such that
σt(u, x) ≥ αt(‖u‖) + βt(‖x‖) ∀x ∈ R
n, u ∈ Rm.
(ii) For all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, the function σt : Rn ×
Rm → R+ is convex in both its arguments.
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(iii) The function σT : Rn → R+ is convex and there
exist a scalar dT and a function βT : R+ → R+,
with limy→+∞ βT (y) = +∞ and βT (y) ≥ dT such
that
σT (x) ≥ βT (‖x‖).
Assumption 5 The function σT (·) is continuous. Fur-
thermore, for every t = 0, . . . , T −1, the function σt(·, u)
is continuous uniformly in u ∈ Rm. Also, the functions
σt(x, ·) are continuous for every x ∈ Rn.
The main result of this section is now presented.
Theorem 4 Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then
the value functions {Vt}
T
t=0 of the ANC game (12) defined
recursively by
VT (x, s) = σ
T (x)− gT (s),
Vt(x, s) = inf
u∈Rn
sup
p∈SN−1
p′Vt(x, s, u) (47)
= sup
p∈SN−1
inf
u∈Rn
p′Vt(x, s, u). (48)
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and x ∈ Rn, s ∈ F , where Vt is
a function X × Rm → RN with components
[Vt(x, s, u)]a , σ
t(x, u)− gt(a, s)
+Et
[
Vt+1(x
t+1, st+1)|xt=x, st=s, ut=u, at=a
]
, (49)
are all well defined, convex and continuous in x. Further-
more, the strategy pair (u∗, p∗) defined by
(u∗)t = arg inf
u∈Rn
sup
p∈SN−1
p′Vt(x, s, u), (50)
(p∗)t = arg sup
p∈SN−1
inf
u∈Rn
p′Vt(x, s, u), (51)
is a saddle-point strategy of the ANC game (12).
Theorem 4 introduces the HJBI equation for the ANC
game (12) associated with the linear plant (46), see (47),
(48). Such an equation reduces finding jammer’s opti-
mal strategies and the corresponding controller’s best
responses for the multi-step ANC problem to a one-step
game-type problem of the type considered in the pre-
vious sections. Unfortunately, even for linear plants it
appears to be difficult to obtain an analytical answer to
the question whether the jammer’s corresponding opti-
mal strategy is randomized or not. The main difficulty
appears to be obtaining a closed form expression for
Vt(x, s) — of course, the tools developed in the previous
sections can be used to characterize a possibility of non-
pure equilibria numerically. An alternative is to consider
greedy jamming strategies, where at each time step the
jammer pursues a strategy which is (sub)optimal only
at this particular time. For example, one possibility is to
use a lower bound for Vt+1 in the HJBI equation (49),
inf
u∈Rn
sup
p∈SN−1
p′V˜t(x, s, u),
[V˜t(x, s, u)]a , σ
t(x, u)− gt(a, s)
+Et
[
νt+1(‖Atx+ b
tBtu‖)
∣∣st = s, at = a] .
While not optimal, such greedy strategies may allow
the jammer launch a randomized DoS attack which will
likely be as difficult to detect as an optimal one. The ef-
fect of such an attack on the overall system performance
and defence strategies against it are an open question.
6 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a class of control prob-
lems over adversarial communication links, in which the
jammer strategically disrupts communications between
the controller and the plant. Initially, we have posed
the problem as a static game, and have given necessary
and sufficient conditions for such a game to have a non-
pure saddle point. This allows a characterization of a set
of plant’s initial states for which a DoS attack can be
mounted that requires a nontrivial controller’s response.
For instance, in two linear quadratic problems analyzed
in Section 4 the optimal control law is nonlinear. This
gives the jammer an advantage over any linear control
policy in those problems. The jammer achieves this by
randomizing its choice of a packet-dropping transmission
regime rather than direct jamming. In those problems,
the part of the state space where the jammer random-
izes is determined by the jammer’s cost of switching (re-
ward for not switching), cost of termination, and transi-
tion probabilities of the current and the most blocking
regimes. If these parameters can be predicted/estimated
by the controller, it has a chance of mitigating the at-
tack by either eliminating those regions, or steering the
plant so that it avoids visiting those regions.
Also, a multi-stage finite-horizon game has been con-
sidered for linear plants. We have shown that equilibria
for that game can be found by solving similar one-stage
games, although in general it is difficult to obtain closed
form solutions for these games, and one may need to re-
sort to solving them numerically. As an alternative, a
greedy suboptimal analysis has been proposed.
Future work will be directed to further understanding
conditions for DoS attacks, with the aim to obtain a
deeper insight into dynamic/multi-step ANC problems.
Another interesting question is whether associating a
distinct payoff with one of the channels is necessary
for the jammer to resort to randomization. The sys-
tem closed-loop stability under the proposed randomized
jamming attack is also an interesting problem, namely
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the question whether it is possible for the jammer to de-
grade control performance and avoid being caught due
to causing an instability. Analysis of this problem re-
quires a different, infinite horizon problem formulation.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Since the process st is a Markov chain, for each t =
0, . . . , T−1 and an arbitrarymeasurable set Λ×S ⊆ X ,
Pr(xt+1 ∈ Λ, st+1 ∈ S|{(xθ, sθ), uθ, aθ}tθ=0)
=
∑
i∈S
P tst,i(a
t)Pr(xt+1 ∈ Λ|st+1 = i, {(xθ, sθ), uθ, aθ}tθ=0).
Furthermore, from (3) and (1), since given st+1, bt is
conditionally independent of {(xθ, sθ), uθ, aθ}tθ=0, then
Pr(xt+1 ∈ Λ, st+1 ∈ S|{(xθ, sθ), {uθ, aθ}tθ=0)
=
∑
i∈S
Pr(xt+1 ∈ Λ|st+1 = i, xt, ut)P tst,i(a
t)
= Pr(xt+1 ∈ Λ, st+1 ∈ S|xt, st, ut, at), (52)
proving that {xt, st}Tt=0 is a Markov process.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
First, we observe that since the function hx,sa (·) is contin-
uous and coercive, then according to [12, Theorem 1.4.1],
infu h
x,s
a (u) > −∞. Let αx be a constant such that αx ≥
maxa,s infu h
x,s
a (u). Owing to the coercivity property of
hx,sa (·) there existsM
s
a(x) such that if ‖u‖ > M
s
a(x) then
hx,sa (u) > η
s,x
a (‖u‖) > αx. Let M(x) = maxa,sM
s
a(x),
and consider the ball U(x) = {u : ‖u‖ ≤ M(x)}. Then
the following facts hold
(i) For all s, Us(x) , {u : maxa∈A h
x,s
a (u) ≤ αx} ⊆
U(x). Indeed, if u ∈ Us(x), then hx,sa (u) ≤ αx
therefore ‖u‖ ≤M sa(x) ≤M(x).
(ii) Also, for all p ∈ SN−1 and x ∈ Rn, s ∈ F ,
{u : p′hx,s(u) ≤ αx} ⊆ U(x) ∀p ∈ SN−1. (53)
Indeed, if ‖u‖ > M(x), then hx,sa (u) > αx for all
a ∈ A and wemust have p′hx,s(u) > αx. Therefore
p′hx,s(u) ≤ αx implies that ‖u‖ ≤M(x).
Using (i) and the fact that p′hx,s(u) is linear in p and
therefore supp∈SN−1 p
′hx,s(u) = maxa∈A h
x,s
a (u), we
obtain
J1 = inf
u∈Rm
max
a∈A
hx,sa (u) ≤ inf
u∈U(x)
max
a∈A
hx,sa (u)
≤ inf
u∈Us(x)
max
a∈A
hx,sa (u) = inf
u∈Us(x)
sup
p∈SN−1
p′hx,s(u). (54)
On the other hand, by definition, for u ∈ Rm\Us(x),
max
a∈A
hx,s(u) > αx, therefore J1= inf
u∈Us(x)
sup
p∈SN−1
p′hx,s(u).
Together with (54) this yields (23).
In a similar manner, from (53) it follows that ∀p ∈
SN−1, infu∈Rm p
′hx,s(u) = infu∈U(x) p
′hx,s(u). The
identity J2 = supp∈SN−1 infu∈U(x) p
′hx,s(u) immedi-
ately follows from that identity, i.e., the rightmost
identity (24) holds.
We have established that both the upper value (19) and
the lower value (20) can be computed by performing
minimization over the compact set U(x) which is also
convex. SinceSN−1 is also compact and convex, and the
payoff function p′hx,s(u) is continuous and convex in u
for each p ∈ SN−1 and is continuous and concave in p
for each u ∈ U(x), the zero-sum game on the right-hand
side of (23) has a saddle point in U(x)×SN−1, but this
saddle point may not be unique [9, Theorem 4, p.168].
That is, the leftmost identity (24) holds and the value
of the zero-sum game over U(x)×SN−1 is finite. Then,
using (23) and (24) we conclude that both J1 and J2 are
finite and equal.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is a variation of well-known arguments re-
garding the connection between convex duality and the
existence of a saddle-point for the Lagrangian, as well
as dual characterization of minimal elements of convex
sets (see, e.g., [8]). Because of our need to incorporate
unboundedness of vector u∗ and non-purity of vector p,
however, we find it clearer to provide a full derivation
here than to directly resort to these arguments.
Consider the set
M := {z ∈ R|G | | ∃u such that HG (u) ≤ z}; (55)
here the notation HG (u) refers to the vector comprised
of the components of H(u) whose indexes belong to G .
Also, the inequality in (55) is understood component-
wise. The interior and the boundary of M are denoted
◦
M and ∂M(=M \
◦
M).
M is clearly convex since H is. In addition, assumption
(b) implies that HG (u
∗) ∈ ∂M . Indeed, HG (u
∗) clearly
belongs toM . If, in addition, we let 1 denote the vector of
all ones then, for any r > 0 the point zr := HG (u
∗)− r|G |1
belongs to the ball B(HG (u
∗), r) of center HG (u
∗) and
radius r in R|G | but does not belong to M since
• HG (u
∗) > zr, and
• according to (b), for any u 6= u∗, there exists i such
that Hi(u) > Hi(u
∗) > (zr)i, i.e., HG (u)  zr ∀u 6=
u∗.
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We have thus shown that, for any r > 0, B(HG (u
∗), r)
is not a subset ofM , which implies thatHG (u
∗) is not in
the interior of M . Now, because HG (u
∗) ∈ ∂M , we can
use the supporting hyperplane theorem (see, e.g., p. 51
of [8]), to claim that there exists p¯ ∈ R|G |, p¯ 6= 0, such
that
p¯′HG (u
∗) ≤ p¯′z for all z ∈M. (56)
Now, we claim that p¯ ∈ R|G |+ . Indeed, note that if z
0 ∈
M , the ray Ri := z
0 + R1+ei ⊂ M , for any basis vector
ei. Hence, because of (56), the function z 7→ p¯
′z is lower-
bounded on Ri, which implies that p¯i ≥ 0. Also note
that p¯ is non-pure, for otherwise, from (56), there would
exist i ∈ G such that Hi(u
∗) = p¯′HG (u
∗) ≤ p¯′HG (u) =
Hi(u) for all u, (because HG (u) ∈ M for all u), which
contradicts (c).
Now, if we define p∗ ∈ RN by p∗i =
p¯i
p¯1+...+p¯|G |
for all
i ∈ G and p∗i = 0 for all i /∈ G , we find that p
∗ ∈ SN−1,
I(p∗) ⊂ G and
(p∗)′H(u∗) =
1
p¯1 + . . .+ p¯|G |
p¯′HG (u
∗)
≤
1
p¯1 + . . .+ p¯|G |
p¯′HG (u) = (p
∗)′H(u)
for all u, which means that u∗ is a best response to
p∗, i.e., u∗ ∈ arg infu∈Rm(p
∗)′H(u). Now, note that
(a) implies that p∗ is a best response to u∗, i.e.,
p∗ ∈ arg supp∈SN−1 p
′H(u∗), since
(p∗)′H(u∗) =
∑
i∈G
p∗iHi(u
∗) = (
∑
i∈G
p∗i ) max
1≤j≤N
Hj(u
∗)
= max
1≤j≤N
Hj(u
∗) ≥ p′H(u∗) for all p ∈ SN−1.
In fact, the same proof would show that any vector with
support included in G is a best response to u∗. Now,
inf
u∈Rm
sup
p∈SN−1
p′H(u)≤ sup
p∈SN−1
p′H(u∗) = (p∗)′H(u∗)
= inf
u∈Rm
(p∗)′H(u)≤ sup
p∈SN−1
inf
u∈Rm
p′H(u),
while it is always true that supp infu p
′H(u) ≤
infu supp p
′H(u). This concludes the proof. ✷
7.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Sufficiency. First we show that (25), (26) and (27) im-
ply the existence of a non-pure saddle point for (19) sup-
ported on G . Without loss of generality suppose
dhx,sa1 (u¯)
du
> 0,
dhx,sa2 (u¯)
du
< 0. (57)
Since hx,sa1 (·) is convex, it follows from (57) that
dhx,sa1
(u)
du
is non-decreasing in the region u ≥ u¯. This is true for all
points u ≥ u¯ including the points of the set Ud where
we have the inequality between the right-hand side and
left-hand side derivatives,
d−hx,sa1
(u)
du
≤
d+hx,sa1
(u)
du
. Hence
dhx,sa1
(u)
du
> 0 for all u ≥ u¯ and thus hx,sa1 (u) > h
x,s
a1
(u¯)
for all u > u¯. In the same manner we can show that
hx,sa2 (u) < h
x,s
a2
(u¯) for all u < u¯. Also, u¯ is not a minimum
of hx,sa1 (·) and h
x,s
a2
(·) since
dhx,sa1
(u¯)
du
6= 0,
dhx,sa2
(u¯)
du
6= 0. The
sufficiency of conditions (25), (26) and (27) now follows
from Theorem 2.
We now consider the second alternative case where
(25), (26) and (28) hold. Since hx,sa1 (u) and h
x,s
a2
(u) are
convex, (28) implies that u¯ is a global minimum of
both hx,sa1 (u) and h
x,s
a2
(u). Therefore for an arbitrary
p ∈ SN−1 with pa = 0 for a 6= G , u¯ is a global minimum
of Eu,pΣ(x+, u, a) = p′H(u), where H(u) = hx,s(u)
is the vector function defined in Theorem 2. That is,
infu p
′H(u) = p′H(u¯) = hx,sa1 (u¯) = h
x,s
a2
(u¯). It then fol-
lows that for arbitrary p¯, p˜ ∈ SN−1 supported on G and
u ∈ R1,
p˜′H(u¯) ≤ p¯′H(u¯) ≤ p¯′H(u). (58)
The leftmost inequality holds since both expressions are
equal to hx,sa1 (u¯) = h
x,s
a2
(u¯).
Next, consider an arbitrary vector p ∈ SN−1. From (26)
we have
p′H(u¯) =
∑
j 6=a2
pjE
u¯,p[Σ(x+, u¯, a)|a = j] + pa2h
x,s
a2
(u¯)
≤ (
∑
j 6=a2
pj)E
u¯,p[Σ(x+, u¯, a)|a = a1] + pa2h
x,s
a2
(u¯)
= p˜′H(u¯), (59)
where p˜ is defined as p˜a1 =
∑
j 6=a2
pj , p˜a2 = pa2 and
p˜a = 0 for a 6∈ G , and is supported on G . Then from (58),
it follows that for all u ∈ R1, and p ∈ SN−1 p′H(u¯) ≤
(p¯)′H(u¯) ≤ (p¯)′H(u). Hence for an arbitrary p¯ ∈ SN−1
supported on G , (u¯, p¯) is a saddle point of the game.
Clearly, a non-pure p¯ exists for this purpose.
Necessity. Let (u∗, p∗), u∗ 6∈ Ud, be a non-pure saddle
point of the game (19) supported on G = {a1, a2}. That
is, 0 < p∗a1 < 1 and
p′H(u∗) ≤ (p∗)′H(u∗) ≤ (p∗)′H(u),
∀u ∈ R1, p ∈ SN−1. (60)
The last inequality implies
inf
u
max
p∈SN−1
p′H(u) ≤ max
p∈SN−1
p′H(u∗) = (p∗)′H(u∗)
= inf
u
(p∗)′H(u) ≤ max
p∈SN−1
inf
u
p′H(u).
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However, the game has the value, therefore all the in-
equalities above are in fact exact identities. That is,
inf
u
max
p∈SN−1
p′H(u) = max
p∈SN−1
p′H(u∗).
In other words, u∗ ∈ arg infumaxp∈SN−1 p
′H(u), and
taking into account linearity of the payoff function in
p, we further have u∗ ∈ arg infumax[h
x,s
a1
(u), hx,sa2 (u)].
We now show that hx,sa1 (u
∗) = hx,sa2 (u
∗). Suppose this is
not true, and hx,sa1 (u
∗) < hx,sa2 (u
∗). Then, since p∗a1 > 0,
p∗a2 > 0, and p
∗
a1
+ p∗a2 = 1 by assumption,
hx,sa2 (u
∗) = (p∗a1 + p
∗
a2
)hx,sa2 (u
∗) > (p∗)′H(u∗).
The latter condition is in contradiction with the leftmost
inequality in (60). The converse inequality hx,sa2 (u
∗) <
hx,sa1 (u
∗) is also not possible, by the same argument. This
proves that hx,sa1 (u
∗) = hx,sa2 (u
∗), i.e., u∗ satisfies the con-
dition (25) of the theorem.
It remains to prove that u∗ satisfies ether (27) or (28).
We prove this by ruling out all other possibilities.
Case 1:
(
dhx,sa1
(u∗)
du
)(
dhx,sa2
(u∗)
du
)
> 0.
First suppose
dhx,sa1
(u∗)
du
< 0,
dhx,sa2
(u∗)
du
< 0. Then, in a
sufficiently small neighbourhood of u∗ one can find a
point u < u∗ such that
hx,sa1 (u) < h
x,s
a1
(u∗) and hx,sa2 (u) < h
x,s
a2
(u∗).
That is, we found a point u < u∗ such that (p∗)′H(u) <
(p∗)′H(u∗). This conclusion is in contradiction with
the rightmost inequality (60). The hypothesis that
dhx,sa1
(u∗)
du
> 0,
dhx,sa2
(u∗)
du
> 0 will lead to a similar contra-
diction. These contradictions rule out Case 1.
Case 2: Either
dhx,sa1
(u∗)
du
= 0 and
dhx,sa2
(u∗)
du
6= 0, or
dhx,sa1
(u∗)
du
6= 0 and
dhx,sa2
(u∗)
du
= 0.
Suppose
dhx,sa1
(u∗)
du
= β > 0 and
dhx,sa2
(u∗)
du
= 0. Since
hx,sa1 (·), h
x,s
a2
(·) are continuously differentiable at u∗, then
for any sufficiently small ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such
that for any u ∈ (u∗ − δ, u∗ + δ),
dhx,sa1
(u)
du
> β − ǫ,∣∣∣dhx,sa2 (u)du ∣∣∣ < ǫ. Let us choose ǫ so that ǫ < p∗a1β < β
and consider the Taylor expansions of hx,sa1 (u), h
x,s
a2
(u),
u∗−δ < u < u∗, with the remainders in the Cauchy form
hx,sa1 (u) = h
x,s
a1
(u∗) +
dhx,sa1 (ξ1)
du
(u− u∗),
hx,sa2 (u) = h
x,s
a2
(u∗) +
dhx,sa2 (ξ2)
du
(u − u∗),
where ξ1, ξ2 ∈ (u, u
∗). Since hx,sa2 (u) is convex and
dhx,sa2
(u∗)
du
= 0, then −ǫ <
dhx,sa2
(ξ2)
du
≤ 0 for u∗ − δ < u <
ξ2 < u
∗. This leads us to conclude that
p∗a1
dhx,sa1 (ξ1)
du
+ p∗a2
dhx,sa2 (ξ2)
du
> p∗a1(β − ǫ)− p
∗
a2
ǫ > 0.
Then we have
(p∗)′H(u) = (p∗)′H(u∗)
+
(
p∗a1
dhx,sa1 (ξ1)
du
+ p∗a2
dhx,sa2 (ξ2)
du
)
(u− u∗)
< (p∗)′H(u∗). (61)
Again, we arrive at a contradiction with the assumption
that (u∗, p∗) is a saddle point and must satisfy (60).
Other similar possibilities in this case will lead to a con-
tradiction as well. This leaves two possibilities: either u∗
satisfies (27), or it satisfies (28).
7.5 Proof of Theorem 4
We need to show that each function Vt is well-defined,
i.e., that there is indeed equality between (47) and (48)
for any x, s; this amounts to the zero-sum game solved
at time t having a value. We will proceed by backwards
induction and show that the following predicate holds
for all t = 0, . . . , T :
(Pt) : Vt(·, s) is a well-defined continuous convex func-
tion for all s ∈ F . In addition, there exist a function
νt and scalar vt such that
(a) νt(y) ≥ vt for all y,
(b) limy→+∞ νt(y) = +∞ and,
(c) Vt(x, s) ≥ νt(‖x‖) for all x ∈ Rn, s ∈ F .
Clearly predicate PT holds since σ
T is convex and con-
tinuous and according to Assumption 4,
VT (x, s) = σ
T (x)− gT (s) ≥ βT (‖x‖)−max
s∈F
gT (s)
, νT (‖x‖) ≥ vT (62)
where vT , dT −maxs∈F g
T (s).
Let us now assume that predicate Pt+1 holds for t ≤
T − 1 and show that Pt holds. Note that
[Vt(x, s, u)]a = σ
t(x, u)− gt(a, s)
+
|F |∑
i=1
P tsi(a)
[
(1− qti)Vt+1(Atx, s)
+ qtiVt+1(Atx+Btu, s)
]
, (63)
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Using Assumption 4 we then find that for all a ∈ A ,
[Vt(x, s, u)]a ≥ αt(‖x‖) + βt(‖u‖)−max
s∈F
gt(a, s)
+
|F |∑
i=1
P tsi(a)
[
(1 − qti)νt+1(‖Atx‖)
+qtiνt+1(‖Atx+Btu‖)
≥ αt(‖x‖) + βt(‖u‖)−max
s∈F
gt(a, s) + vt+1. (64)
That is, for all fixed (x, s) ∈ X , a ∈ A , the function
[Vt(x, c, s, ·)]a is coercive on Rm.
Also, since according to predicate Pt+1, Vt+1(·, s) is a
continuous function, then by Assumption 5 the function
[Vt(x, s, ·)]a is continuous on Rm for all x ∈ Rn, a ∈ A ,
and s ∈ F . Finally, we note that since Vt+1(·, s) is a
convex function by assumption, and Atx+Btu is linear
with respect to u, then Vt+1(Atx + Btu, s) is convex in
u. Also, σt(x, u) is convex in u by Assumption 4. Hence
we conclude that [Vt(x, s, ·)]a is convex.
We have verified all the conditions of Lemma 1, which
can now be applied to ascertain that the inf sup and
sup inf expressions in (47) and (48) are equal and fi-
nite. Thus, the function Vt(x, s) is well-defined, and
there exists a saddle point pair of strategies (u∗)t(x, s),
(p∗)t(x, s) defined by the static zero-sum game (47).
Furthermore, it follows from (64) that Vt(x, s) satis-
fies properties (a)-(c) stated in predicate Pt with the
function νt(·) and constant vt defined as
νt(y) = αt(y) + dt −max
a∈A
max
s∈F
gt(a, s) + vt+1;
vt = et + dt −max
a∈A
max
s∈F
gt(a, s) + vt+1.
It remains to prove that Vt(·, s) is convex and continuous.
For continuity, we note that composition of Vt+1(·, s)
and Atx + Btu is continuous uniformly in u, since the
latter function has this property and the former function
is continuous. Then P tsi(a)q
t
iVt+1(Atx + Btu, s) is also
continuous uniformly in u. Therefore, for every x˜ ∈ Rn
and ǫ > 0 one can find δa,s(x˜, ǫ) > 0 which does not
depend on u and such that ‖x − x˜‖ < δa,s(x˜, ǫ) implies
|(Vt(x, s, u))a − (Vt(x˜, s, u))a| <
ǫ
2 . Selecting δ(x˜, ǫ) =
mina,s δ
a,s(x˜, ǫ) we obtain
p′Vt(x˜, s, u)−
ǫ
2
< p′Vt(x, s, u) < p
′
Vt(x˜, s, u) +
ǫ
2
∀x ∈ {x : ‖x− x˜‖ ≤ δ(x˜, ǫ)}, p ∈ SN−1.
From here we readily conclude that
inf
u
sup
p∈SN−1
p′Vt(x˜, s, u)− ǫ
≤ inf
u
sup
p∈SN−1
p′Vt(x, s, u) < inf
u
sup
p∈SN−1
p′Vt(x˜, s, u) + ǫ,
for all x ∈ {x : ‖x − x˜‖ ≤ δ(x˜, ǫ)}, proving that Vt(·, s)
is continuous at an arbitrarily chosen x˜.
For convexity of Vt(·, s), we note that each function
(x, u) → (Vt(x, s, u))a is convex since σ
t is convex in
(x, u) and Vt+1(·, s) is convex by the induction hypoth-
esis. As a result, the function supp∈SN−1 p
′Vt(x˜, s, u) is
convex in (x, u); see [8, Section 3.2.3]. In turn, using
identity (23) of Lemma 1, we conclude that
Vt(x, s) = inf
u∈Rm
sup
p∈SN−1
p′Vt(x˜, s, u)
= inf
U(x)
sup
p∈SN−1
p′Vt(x˜, s, u)
is convex since U(x) is a convex set.
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